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he 1980 Bayh-Dole Act established a uniform, government-wide policy in favor
of allowing academic recipients of federal
research funding the right to seek patents on
inventions arising from that funding. Although
federal funding obviates the usual “incentive
to invent” justification for patents, Bayh-Dole’s
sponsors believed that giving patent ownership to grantees would be the most effective
mechanism for further developing university
discoveries into the new products and industries necessary for maintaining national competitiveness1.
Bayh-Dole does not, however, confer
entirely unfettered discretion upon grantees.
To the contrary, the Act contains accountability safeguards, including requirements for
reporting not simply the existence of federally
funded patents but also information regarding
the licensing, assignment and practical utilization of these patents. The Act also provides the
government with an array of retained rights in
the work that it funds2.
At least in theory, these accountability
safeguards are a significant policy tool. To
the extent that reporting is implemented
faithfully, it creates a data set that could be
extremely useful for evaluating the impact of
government funding and for calibrating how
funding should be deployed in the future.
Proper reporting also assists the government
in determining whether it should exercise
its retained rights. These include the right to
compel additional licensing in cases where the
grantee or its licensee and/or assignee has not
achieved “practical application” of an invention3. Concerns that federally funded academic
patents are being used to hinder development
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New data indicating underreporting of federal funding in academic biomedical patents highlight the pressing need
for greater transparency under the Bayh-Dole Act.
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Figure 1 Percentage of academic biomedical patents with government-interest statements

rather than promote it can arise when universities or their licensees and/or assignees assert
these patents against independent commercializers3,4. They can also arise when universities license or assign federally funded patents
to firms that aggregate these patents in mass
quantities for purposes of assertion against
firms that produce products5. Indeed, in the
latter case, proper reporting regarding utilization may be the only mechanism by which the
government knows how a federally funded patent was deployed. Universities are reluctant to
publicize their dealings with aggregators6, and
aggregators typically do not record exclusive
licenses with the US Patent and Trademark
Office. Even assignments may not be recorded,
or are recorded using names of shell companies
that are nontransparent5, with the consequence
that assignment data can obscure rather than
clarify questions of utilization.
Proper reporting could also reduce taxpayer costs associated with procurement. As
the Government Accountability Office (GAO)
has pointed out7, the government has a right
under Bayh-Dole to royalty-free practice of
patents on federally funded inventions. The
importance of Bayh-Dole’s accountability provisions has been highlighted by several recent

events. In Stanford v. Roche8, a 2011 Supreme
Court case addressing the question of whether
universities or individual academic scientists
should have default ownership under BayhDole, the US government invoked as an argument in favor of default university ownership
the claim that such ownership would more
readily promote accountability than ownership by individual scientists9. A 2010 National
Academy of Sciences (NAS) report on BayhDole has several chapters and recommendations that specifically target accountability10.
Most recently, in the 2011 America Invents
Act, universities secured a privileged position
for their patents. Unlike all other infringement defendants, defendants charged with
infringement of patents that originated in a
university will not be able to assert a newly
enacted defense of “prior use”11. Thus, even
in cases where a defendant has successfully
commercialized without even being aware of
a subsequently issued patent originating in a
university, the defendant could be found guilty
of infringement. The privileged position universities and their assignees and/or licensees
now hold in patent litigation, even against
prior, independent commercializers, makes
proper information as to whether those patents
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involved federal funding even more important. If universities and their licensees and/or
assignees were to assert patents governed by
Bayh-Dole’s commercialization imperative
against prior users, universities would directly
contravene the goals of Bayh-Dole.
Unfortunately, as the 2010 NAS report notes,
much of the actual data on compliance with
reporting are incomplete and quite stale. The
last quantitative study on compliance dates
back to the 1990s12. This prior research, largely
conducted by the GAO, also does not attempt
to determine trends over time. Here we present fresh data, quantitative and qualitative, on
academic biomedical patents, focusing on the
period from 1980 to 2007. These data suggest
underreporting throughout the period, albeit
with some improvement over time.
However, because of the nearly complete
secrecy associated with relevant government
databases, our research can shed light only
on one aspect of the accountability puzzle—
whether the existence of patents was properly
reported. We cannot investigate completeness
of reporting regarding licensing and/or assignment and utilization. This level of secrecy is
unnecessary and counterproductive. We argue
that, through modest tweaks in relevant BayhDole regulations, the government could foster
much greater transparency and accountability,
including on the fundamental question of how
the current Bayh-Dole regime is fostering—or
failing to foster—innovation and competitiveness.

Prior research regarding compliance
with reporting
As noted, recent empirical data on compliance with reporting requirements are sparse.
Relevant information on reporting to agencies
resides in Interagency Edison (iEdison), which
incorporates information by grantees provided
to the 29 funding agencies16. Nongovernmental
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Bayh-Dole’s accountability provisions
Under Section 202(c) of Bayh-Dole, a grantee
must report to the US agency from which
it received funding any patent application
the grantee files. The section also allows
agencies to require “periodic reporting” on
utilization or efforts at achieving utilization. Most agencies require such reporting. Subsequent judicial cases interpreting

Bayh-Dole have held that failure to report
inventions to the funding agency allows the
agency to assert title over the patent13.
Additionally, as the legislative history of the
Bayh-Dole Act emphasizes1, some of the Act’s
reporting requirements create an opportunity
for third parties to supplement the oversight
efforts of resource-strapped funding agencies. For example, Section 202(c) requires not
only reporting to funding agencies but also a
statement in the public patent document itself
regarding the existence of federal funding and
the fact that the government retains certain
rights because of this funding. This “government interest” statement alerts third parties
negatively affected by improper use of a patent
of their ability to petition the funding agency
to exercise these retained rights1. Specifically,
based on third-party complaints regarding a
grantee’s inability to “achieve practical application” of an invention or to use the invention
“to alleviate health and safety needs,” an agency
may choose to require additional licensing by a
grantee or its licensee14.
Although funding agencies have, thus far,
refrained from actually exercising this retained
right, it has provided important leverage in
fostering voluntary moves towards more
commercialization-friendly licensing by universities, including in such important cases as
the foundational stem cell patents held by the
University of Wisconsin15. Moreover, to the
extent reporting is incomplete, better reporting might well foster greater awareness of the
need to exercise retained rights.
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Figure 2 Percentage of academic life sciences research federally funded by year. Calculations based on
data from NSF WebCASPAR database.
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researchers are, however, denied any direct
access to the iEdison database. GAO has occasionally investigated completeness of reporting to iEdison, but the last study containing
actual data was conducted in 1999 (ref. 11). A
follow-up report issued in 2003 (ref. 7) simply examined whether the agencies studied in
1999 had made procedural efforts to improve
compliance. The 2003 study did not determine
whether compliance had in fact improved.
The lack of recent empirical data is particularly worrisome because the 1999 GAO report
found that, out of a sample of 633 medically
related patents issued to 12 academic grantees,
143 had most likely arisen from US National
Institutes of Health (NIH) funding but had neither been reported to iEdison nor contained
government-interest statements.
Academic biomedical patents
In our research, we also focused on academic
biomedical patents. Using a definition of “academic” developed by one of us in prior work17,
we obtained information on all academic patents issued from 1980 to 2007. About 40% of
all academic patents issued during this period
mapped to six biomedical patent classes (435,
514, 424, 530, 536 and 600).
Overall, 43% of these patents had government-interest statements. This share has
shifted substantially over time, rising from
30% to 40% in the early 1980s before reaching
a nadir of 28% around 1991 (Fig. 1). Since
1991, the percentage has gone up steadily,
reaching 53% in 2006. By contrast, the federal
share of total biomedical funding decreased
somewhat in both the early 1980s and the
mid to late 1990s (Fig. 2). Thus, reporting
trends are unlikely to reflect changes in the
composition of research funding. Moreover,
because about 60% of academic biomedical
research was federally funded in the period
between 1980 and 2007 (Fig. 2), the overall 43% incidence of government-interest
statements provides prima facie evidence of
underdisclosure.
To provide another perspective on the
reporting question, we looked at correspondence over time between reporting of patents
to the NIH and statements of government
interest in the patent document itself. As
noted, nongovernment researchers do not
have direct access to iEdison. However, the
NIH RePORTER database, unveiled in 2010
to provide information on NIH grants in
general, imports data on patents reported to
NIH from iEdison and thus provides a small
window into that otherwise secret database.
The RePORTER website appropriately cautions that “[n]ot all recipients are compliant
with the iEdison reporting requirements”16.

volume 30 number 10 october 2012 nature biotechnology

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2184926

0.7
0.5

0.6

Percentage

0.8

0.9

pat e n t s

1980

1985

1990

Issue year

1995

2000

2005

few of the inventors appear to have been supported by federal grants covering similar territory during the time of the relevant research,
we deemed the situation “unclear.” We also
deemed “unclear” situations where the federally funded research appeared to cover compounds closely related to the patented drug,
but we could not resolve the precise question
of overlap. Based on this lack of clarity, we
excluded five drugs and five associated patents.
Even with these exclusions, we determined that
15 patents (and 8 associated drugs) raised substantial questions about appropriate reporting.
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Figure 3 Percentage of RePORTER patents with government-interest statements.

Even so, the RePORTER data can be used to
determine if institutions that reported patents
to iEdison also complied with the Bayh-Dole
requirement that the public patent document
itself acknowledge that the invention had
emerged from federal funding. Simply put, all
patents disclosed in RePORTER should have
a government-interest statement in the patent
document itself.
Figure 3 shows that the share of RePORTER
patents that have a government-interest statement has generally increased over time, with
the inflection point coming in 1990, at about
the same time that the overall percentage of
government-interest statements in academic
biomedical patents began to increase. However,
the incidence of government-interest statements has generally hovered between 60%
and 80% (Fig. 3). For RePORTER patents, the
incidence of government-interest statements
should always be 100%. Even as of 2007, the
incidence rate was less than 90%.
FDA-approved drugs
We also examined these reporting issues qualitatively for patents on FDA-approved smallmolecule drugs. Biomedical therapeutics like
drugs are directly important for healthcare,
including healthcare purchased by the US
government7, and thus are particularly likely
to raise concerns about lack of accountability.
A prior study by one of us18 contains a prima
facie suggestion of noncompliance with reporting obligations. That study aimed to assess the
role of the public sector in the development
of drugs approved by the US Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) between 1988 and 2005.
It did so by examining government-interest
statements in the patents on those drugs.
However, to examine the robustness of results
to alternate indicators of government influence, the study also examined all drugs where
academic institutions held patents. Comparing
the two measures, of the 48 drugs with academic patents identified in that study, 21 (44%)
had no government-interest statement in their

patents. In addition to these drugs (where none
of the patents acknowledged government support), seven other drugs were associated with
some academic patents that acknowledged
government support, but others that did not.
Following up on this initial finding, we
determined that a total of 43 patents without
government-interest statements were associated with the 28 drugs. Consistent with the lack
of full correspondence between RePORTER
and government-interest statements noted
above, 7 of the 43 patents were listed in the
NIH RePORTER database. The remaining
36 patents (associated with 22 drugs) did not
acknowledge government funding in any way.
Should the 36 patents have been reported?
Under the Bayh-Dole Act, an invention is a
“subject invention” governed by reporting obligations and retained government rights if it was
“conceived of or first actually reduced to practice in the performance of work under a funding agreement”19. In practice, as many decades
of expensive patent litigation over “conception”
and “reduction to practice” has shown, these
legal terms of art are hardly a model of clarity. In the case of Bayh-Dole, moreover, one
has to determine whether conception or first
reduction to practice occurred while the scientist was performing work under the funding
agreement.
These caveats aside, one can examine the
extent to which inventors on the 36 patents
at issue were receiving federal grants covering the same inventive territory as the patent before the patent application was filed. In
some cases, one can also link publications to
grants and thereby further rely on the relationship between information disclosed in
the publication and the patent document.
For our qualitative study, we used all publicly
available scientific information contained in
inventors’ grants and publications at relevant
times.
For our analysis, we used a conservative
definition of “subject invention.” For example,
when a patent had many inventors and only a
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Discussion
Overall, the data suggest that universities are
improving their compliance with reporting
obligations. That said, reporting is incomplete
and could be improved further. Reporting is
incomplete even for inventions such as FDAapproved drugs that presumably should be
high on the radar screen of university technology transfer offices. Moreover, the fact
that reporting regarding the mere existence of
patents is incomplete does not bode well for
reporting on actual utilization.
Although the burden of accurate reporting should be relatively small, incomplete
reporting has many important consequences.
Where no patent information whatsoever
is reported, the consequence is uncertainty
about the federal government’s “march in”
rights and understatement of the public sector
role in innovation. In cases where patents are
reported, but reporting on utilization is incomplete, university success in achieving commercialization of federally funded research cannot
be assessed comprehensively.
Notably, the lack of transparency surrounding iEdison makes assessment of compliance difficult. Lack of transparency is
especially acute outside the biomedical field—
in biomedicine, the NIH RePORTER database
has at least made indirect access to a small portion of iEdison available. Greater transparency
would not only facilitate better assessment of
compliance but would itself improve compliance. Universities that knew compliance was
going to be monitored, not only by funding
agencies but also by third-party firms, academics and public-interest groups would presumably be motivated to improve compliance.
More fundamentally, and across all fields,
lack of transparency makes systematic analysis of Bayh-Dole’s overall success difficult.
Although reports on utilization of patented
inventions are contemplated by Bayh-Dole, and
are required by many agencies, third parties
do not have access to information regarding
report completeness or to underlying specific
information, presumably contained at least in
955

reports that are complete, about exactly who
universities are transacting with and whether
university intellectual property management
has facilitated commercialization. Such lack
of access is unfortunate, as third parties could
substantially supplement the analytic efforts of
government researchers.
The Bayh-Dole Act does not require this
level of secrecy. To the contrary, the requirements regarding government-interest statements in public patent documents and
march-in contemplate active participation by
third parties. The Act does contain a provision
stating that utilization information provided
by grantees “shall be treated” by the federal
funding agency as exempt from mandatory
disclosure under the Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA)20. The Commerce Department,
which administers Bayh-Dole, currently reads
this statutory language as requiring the agency
to refrain from disclosing “such information to
persons outside the government without permission of the contractor”21.
Contrary to the Commerce Department
interpretation, however, the Supreme Court
has clearly held that agencies have discretion
to disclose information that Congress has
exempted from mandatory disclosure under
FOIA. Specifically, in Chrysler v. Brown22, the
Court determined that so long as information disclosed by an agency did not encom-

pass trade secrets traceable to a specific entity
or individual, such disclosure was permissible. The Commerce Department could work
with funding agencies to devise mechanisms
for information release consistent with the
Chrysler v. Brown standard, particularly in
cases where the passage of time has diminished
the trade secret value of relevant information.
An advantage of the accountability safeguards embedded in Bayh-Dole is that they
should produce a wealth of data. But these
data are currently shrouded in secrecy, so their
robustness cannot be assessed, and policy lessons cannot be drawn from them. Although
our research sheds some light, federal agencies
could, within the limits imposed by law and
sound policy, shed much more.
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